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THE ADJUDICATION OF MINOR OFFENSES
IN NEW YORK CITY
Ian Weinstein*
So I came to the City to shop with my friend. First we were
downtown and I bought the knife. You know, they sell them
right on the sidewalk in front of the stores for like $7.00. Then
we went uptown, cause the best hip hop clothes are there and
first I stopped to see my cousin. He was not home and we were
walking downtown from his building and two cops come around
the corner and come right over to us.
"What happened next?" asked Joe, a third year law student in
our Criminal Defense Clinic.
Well, the cop says something like-"What are you doing in this
neighborhood, are you here to buy drugs, don't you know this is
a dangerous place" and stuff like that. And I said, "It is a free
country," or something, I know I talked back. So I guess he did
not like that. So the two cops shove us up against this chain link
fence and start frisking us, but he does not find anything on me.
So he says, "Do you have a knife on you?" and I say "Yes, but it
is under four inches and I can have that." So he says "Give it to
me slowly," and I did. And he says, "You are under arrest."1
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Henrique Ramos sat in a little metal booth, on the opposite
side of a metal grill from Joe Raines, Tara Hudson, and me. The
three of us were crammed into a space of about twelve square feet
in an interview booth behind Arraignment Part I at New York
County Criminal Court. It was mid-September. This morning the
air conditioning was working and the air was cold. Even with the
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law and Supervising Attor-
ney of Fordham's Criminal Defense Clinic. Thanks to Cheryl Bader, Deborah Denno,
Martha Rayner, Monica Rickenberg, the students in Fordham's Advanced Criminal
Law Seminar, and my research assistant, Annabelle Chan. Fordham University pro-
vided financial support for this project.
1. Statement made by Henrique Ramos, a twenty-two year old college sopho-
more. Henrique Ramos and the Ramos case are composites based upon dozens of
clients with whom I have worked in the Criminal Defense Clinic at Fordham Univer-
sity School of Law. Our clinic represents people charged with minor offenses in the
New York County Criminal Court, the lower criminal court that serves the borough of
Manhattan in New York City.
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dim lights, peeling paint, claustrophobic space, and noise from the
twenty or thirty people in the two big cells that took up most of the
area behind the courtroom, it was not a particularly noxious morn-
ing back in the pens.
Mr. Ramos had been arrested for possession of a gravity knife at
about 2:30 p.m. on a Tuesday afternoon. Joe, Tara, and I met him
at about 8:30 a.m. on Wednesday morning. Joe and Tara were stu-
dents in our Criminal Defense Clinic and I was their Supervising
Attorney. Joe had already reviewed the complaint with Mr. Ra-
mos, taken his personal history, and advised him that he would
very likely be released on his own recognizance once he appeared
before the judge.
"And then what happened?", asked Joe, continuing the
interview.
Well, after they check out my friend and don't find anything on
him, they tell him to get out of that area and stay out. They
already had me cuffed. So they take me to the police station
and the cop is telling me, I know you are a drug dealer. And he
is sitting there holding my phone, and it rings and he answers it.
He tells me he is going to get one of my drug calls and then he'll
have me on a distribution charge, and I tell him he isn't going to
get anything. So after an hour or so, he tells me I'm just lucky
he can't make a drug case today, but he'll be watching me and
I'm going to have a record. He says I shouldn't carry a gravity
knife and I should stay out of that neighborhood-it's danger-
ous. And he took my $375.00 shopping money and I want it
back.
"Yes, I can understand that. You have already given me quite a
lot to think about," commented Joe.
Indeed, Mr. Ramos had given us quite a lot to think about that
morning. As the case worked out, however, most of the questions I
had were never answered. Mr. Ramos ended his case on his third
appearance in court, pleading guilty to disorderly conduct,2 a non
criminal resolution under New York State law. Although the case
posed interesting legal and factual issues well worthy of litigation,
American lower criminal courts have long been structurally incapa-
ble of adjudicating legal and factual disputes in the vast majority of
the cases that come before them.3 The story I tell in this essay
2. N.Y. PENAL Law § 240.20 (Consol. 2003).
3. In 2002, 0.2% of all dispositions (650 out of 325,193) in the New York City
Criminal Courts were by verdict after trial. STATE OF NEW YORK, TWENTY-FIFTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS FOR THE CALEN-
DAR YEAR 2002, 17 & tbl. 11 (2002); see also, Chester L. Mirsky, The Political Econ-
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illustrates how America's reliance on overcriminalization,
prosecutorial discretion, and procedural guarantees makes it very
difficult for our lower criminal courts to reliably sort minor cases
according to their merits.
These are not new problems for the courts that adjudicate minor
offenses. Although Mr. Ramos was arrested and prosecuted in
New York City in the very first years of the twenty-first century,
there is a timelessness about the lower criminal court in America,
the institution that accounts for ninety percent of all criminal cases
in the United States.4 For more than 120 years it has been charac-
terized by, and consistently criticized for, its rapid pace, relative
indifference to law, inability to influence police practices, lenient
sanctions, and ripe atmosphere.5 All of those themes played out in
Mr. Ramos's case, in which questionable conduct by both Mr. Ra-
mos and the state was, in the end, essentially glossed over by all
involved. This essay argues that if we aspire to improve how we
adjudicate minor cases, we must get clear on why it is so difficult to
reach the merits of minor cases. Given the endless supply of cases
and the low stakes involved in each case, it will always be more
attractive to appear very busy rather than to invest the resources
adjudication on the merits requires.
But we can do better and we should. These are the courts where
the vast bulk of American criminal adjudication takes place.
Known by a variety of names, these courts handle all aspects of
non-felony offenses and typically process the earliest phases of fel-
ony cases. They account for most of Americans' direct exposure to
omy and Indigent Defense: New York City, 1917-1998, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 893,
1016 (1997). In 1997, New York City Criminal Courts (throughout all five boroughs)
disposed of 388,887 misdemeanor and petty offense cases, but only 0.1% (581) were
from trial verdicts; 51.3% (199,490) were from guilty pleas; and 33.8% (133,601) were
from dismissals. Id. The trial rate for felonies is much higher, but still quite low in
absolute terms. In Supreme Court (throughout all five boroughs), there were 41,770
dispositions only 6.6% (2,749) were from trial verdicts, 82.3% (34,251) from guilty
pleas, and 9.7% (4,046) were from dismissals. Id.
4. MALCOM M. FEELEY, PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 5 (1992) (In systems operating with a two-tiered criminal
court system, roughly divided by misdemeanor and felony jurisdiction, about ninety to
ninety-five percent of all cases are handled by lower courts).
5. See id. at 5-34 (describing factors contributing to the crisis in the courts). See
generally HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); Ros-
COE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1930) (exploring the problem of crimi-
nal justice and tracing the historical development of the criminal justice system from
the nineteenth century to the present); Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky,
Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
581, 652-53 (1987).
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the judicial aspects of the criminal justice system. These courts
have been the focus of renewed attention in recent years, as public
order policing6 has dramatically increased the number of low level
arrests in many jurisdictions,7 and the problem solving movement
has led to the establishment of specialized lower courts in many
jurisdictions.8 Yet the high volume, rapid-fire, misdemeanor court
persists.
The timelessness of the lower criminal court, the intractability of
its essentially lawless, rapid processing of cases is deeply rooted in
American criminal justice. It flows all too readily from the central
6. Public order policing, usually associated with the "Broken Windows Theory"
first put forward by James Q. Wilson, is one name for a policing strategy that encour-
ages vigorous enforcement of minor offenses. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling,
Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1982, at 29. New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton adopted Wilson
and Kelling's Broken Windows thesis as the basis for the city's new policing initiative
in 1994. See generally CITY OF NEW YORK, POLICE DEP'T, POLICE STRATEGY No. 5:
RECLAIMING THE PUBLIC SPACES OF NEW YORK (1994) (setting forth the New York
City Police Department's strategy for improving disorderly conditions); see also Wil-
liam J. Bratton, Policy Review: The New York City Police Department's Civil Enforce-
ment of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J. L. & POL'Y 447, 447-51 (1995). As practiced by
Bratton, head of New York's Transit Police, Mayor Giuliani's Police Commissioner,
and now the head of the Los Angeles Police Department, this style of policing in-
cludes: 1) statistical emphasis (i.e. extensive use of information technology to identify
crimes patterns and develop statistically driven assessments of police techniques); 2) a
high contact strategy (wherein the police seek to interact with as many minor offend-
ers as possible to maximize the number of searches and warrant checks they do); and
3) flooding the zone (saturation policing which involves using the statistics generated
by the information technology to target particular neighborhoods for intensive police
activity). See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Mainte-
nance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 293, 377-81 (1998); Ana Joanes,
Does the New York City Police Department Deserve Credit for the Decline in New
York City's Homicide Rates? A Cross-City Comparison of Policing Strategies and
Homicide Rates, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 265, 274-81 (2000).
7. Shortly after the city implemented this scheme, misdemeanor arrests jumped
more than fifty percent in the first three years. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 10 (2001). By 1998,
the total number of adult misdemeanor arrests had increased by 66.3%, from 129,404
in 1993, to 215,158. NEW YORK STATE, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES
2000, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INDICATORS (2000), available at http://criminaljusr-
tice.state.ny.us/cgi/internet/areastat.cgi.
8. See generally Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye, Problem Solving Courts: From Ad-
versarial Litigation to Innovative Jurisprudence: Eleventh Annual Symposium on Con-
temporary Urban Challenges, Keynote Address The Changing Face of Justice, 29
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1925 (2002).
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organizing principles of our system, overcriminalization, 9 and exec-
utive discretion.' 0
There is an endless supply of defendants to keep the lower courts
busy. The executive can, and often will, bring many cases in, but
choose to fully litigate very few of them.1 For the prosecutors and
the police, most of the benefits of the enforcement of minor crimes
seemingly come from initiating the contact with the criminal justice
system. For differing reasons, defendants, prosecutors and judges
have little incentive to reach the merits of these cases and sort
them according to their real deserts. Not enough is at stake to
make it worthwhile. This essay argues that there is no effective
judicial check on executive authority in the misdemeanor cases
which account for ninety percent of the citizen police encounters
9. Overcriminalization occurs when the legislature passes broad criminal laws,
which criminalize more conduct than we can or would choose to prosecute and sanc-
tion. It would be inefficient and draconian to enforce every tax law to the letter, upon
every taxpayer. We rely upon official discretion to sort out the cases worthy of en-
forcement. Another kind of overcriminalization occurs when the legislature passes
multiple statutes that may apply to the same conduct, giving the executive the discre-
tion to bring appropriate charges in a given case.
10. Executive discretion refers to both the discretion of the police on the street,
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 4-5
(1969), and the almost unreviewable discretion prosecutors exercise in their power to
decide whether and what charges to bring against any particular defendant. See Ian
Weinstein, The Discontinuous Tradition of Sentencing Discretion: Koon's Failure to
Recognize the Reshaping of Judicial Discretion Under the Guidelines, 79 B.U. L. REV.
493, n.99 (1999). Prosecutorial discretion is an important mechanism for allocating
criminal justice resources. For the debate on the use of prosecutorial discretion to
allocate resources, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Mar-
ket System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983) (discussing incentives favoring plea bargain-
ing and arguing that prosecutorial discretion is an efficient and fair regulator). See
also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43 (1988) (arguing 1) that prosecutorial discretion in charging, bargain-
ing, and sentencing does not lead to most efficient results because of problems of
public management, and 2) even if it were most efficient, fairness concerns would still
justify some controls on discretion).
There are supposed to be political limits on this authority. Prosecutors who abuse
their power, or use it ineffectively, will lose office when either they, or their executive
bosses, are voted out of office. These political controls are also supposed to give
defendants some leverage against prosecutorial power. They, or their counsel, can
make a public issue of abuse of power to invoke these political controls. The power of
these controls has received critical attention. See Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got To
Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological And Other Non-Legal Factors Influ-
encing The Development Of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 42-53
(1997) (cataloguing public opinion influences on criminal sentencing); Daniel C. Rich-
man, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion,
46 UCLA L. REV. 757 (1999) (arguing that Congress exercises more control over
federal prosecutorial discretion than is usually recognized through hearings, informal
contacts, control of high level appointments and other mechanisms).
11. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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that result in a constitutionally cognizable seizure of the person
and deprivation of liberty.
The structural features which make lower courts process, rather
than adjudicate, cases have received significant policy and doctrinal
encouragement in recent years. As legislators have passed even
more criminal statutes, legal doctrine has stepped away from more
aggressive limiting of police conduct in criminal cases, and the vig-
orous enforcement of minor crimes has become the received wis-
dom of crime control. Overcriminalization and discretion,
however, are the broad boundaries within which many different
criminal justice vogues have flourished. 12 Indeed, the real genius
behind very important shift in law enforcement that has come to be
known as public order policing. 13 It recognizes that a major shift
to much more active law enforcement could be accomplished with
almost no change in the law and would work with and be re-en-
forced by the real world unintended consequences of the adjudica-
tive mechanisms intended, by another era, to reduce police
activism. 14
Public order policing is a wonderful fit with overcriminalization,
executive discretion and rapid fire adjudication in our lower courts.
I argue that it is too good a fit. In a system built on checks and
balances, reliant on inefficiencies to limit the reach of official
power,'15 and police discretion to enforce and sanction minor trans-
gressions, has become too great.
The judicial authority of the lower criminal court is a very weak
constraint on how police interact with citizens accused of minor
crimes for two interrelated reasons. First, the law gives police of-
ficers very broad scope to arrest citizens for minor offenses. On
any given day, if you drive a car, walk, or stand on a sidewalk or
public road, you likely subject yourself to the legal possibility of
12. For a trenchant, insightful discussion of the rapid shift from the rehabilitative
to the punitive model in American criminal justice policy, see generally DAVID GAR-
LAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY (2001) (discussing how the rehabilitative ideal suddenly collapsed in the late
1970s and early 1980s).
13. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. See Richman, supra note 10, at 765. Richman argues that:
[W]ith maximal jurisdiction but limited resources [federal enforcers] have
the best of both worlds. Their resource limitations generally allow them to
avoid taking responsibility for crime on any particular beat, but, at the same
time, they can be confident that they will have a criminal statute to fit any
anti-social conduct they choose to pursue.
1162
ADJUDICATION OF MINOR OFFENSES
arrest and twenty-four hours of detention without much likelihood
of substantial legal remedy. Our regime of overcriminalization and
executive discretion vests a degree of authority in our police and
prosecutors that many will find surprising. Second, the system im-
poses such significant costs on citizens who seek to vindicate their
rights in minor cases that many violations are never pursued. Most
who are arrested for a minor traffic offense or loitering, jaywalking
or other minor charges are angry at first, but end up happy to just
end the whole thing and move on. If the defendants and their law-
yers feel that way, the prosecutors will not insist that they pursue
the matter. The court, however, might take a different stance, but
as is discussed later, they do not.
American criminal justice is founded on overcriminalization and
discretion.16 Our legislatures have long criminalized much more
conduct than can be effectively sanctioned." American police and
prosecutors have been granted virtually unreviewable authority
(discretion18 ) to allocate19 investigative and prosecutorial re-
sources.2" Minor crimes absorb the bulk of our ordinary, local en-
forcement efforts and there is an endless supply of minor crime
which may be pursued. There has been recent and insightful com-
mentary on the explosion of criminal statutes over the past fifteen
years, but even before this trend the great discretion our criminal
law confers upon the police and prosecutors has long been evident
in our minor statutes.
Anywhere in America today, if a practical and experienced po-
lice officer decides to impose some constraint, and even a minor
sanction on the average person, she can often do so with almost
certain impunity, regardless of the circumstances. This state of af-
fairs runs counter to the notion that official power is constrained in
our legal culture-that law enforcement must have a reason under
16. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. Rev. 505 (2001) (discussing the vicious cycle whereby politically motivated
legislative overcriminalization leads to increased prosecutorial discretion, which in
turn facilitates further legislative overcriminalization).
17. See id. at 519.
18. For discussion of the various meanings of discretion in American law, see
Weinstein, supra note 10, at 497-506.
19. For the debate on the use of prosecutorial discretion to allocate resources, see
Easterbrook, supra note 10, at 289 (discussing the incentives favoring plea bargaining
and arguing that prosecutorial discretion is an efficient and fair regulator), and
Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 43 (arguing that prosecutorial discretion in charging,
bargaining and sentencing does not lead to the most efficient results because of
problems of public management and even if it were "most efficient, fairness concerns
would still justify some controls on discretion.").
20. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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the Fourth Amendment 21 to intrude-but this example captures
the reality of our law. Police resources, not minor offenders, limit
the number of arrests for minor offenses.
We look first at the breadth of our minor substantive criminal 22
statutes. Many, if not most Americans repeatedly violate our sub-
stantive laws everyday, exposing themselves to police intrusion into
their lives. Our cultural fixation on the automobile provides one of
the broadest entry points for official interaction with ordinary citi-
zens. 23 In short, it is almost impossible to drive a car in America
without giving the police a legally valid reason to stop and arrest
you.
Walking down the street, or sitting on a stoop, is little better.
The New York Penal Code24 proscriptions against disorderly con-
duct,25 harassment,26 menacing,27 and simple assault,28 considered
with provisions scattered through other section of New York Law
that govern public consumption of alcohol,29 littering,30 and noise
pollution,31 begin to illustrate how many opportunities each of us
has to break the law. For those of us who spend most of our days
in our private offices and then walk, within the crosswalks, to a
commuter train on which we are not inclined to eat, drink, or sit on
two seats and then walk home, again within the crosswalks, and
stay in our homes until the next workday; the opportunities for po-
lice contact are reasonably limited. For those of us who drive, fre-
quently ride public transit, are inclined to eat or drink out of doors,
or whose dispositions may result in our raising our voices in a pub-
lic setting; the opportunities are somewhat greater. The point is
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. Although criminal here is a misnomer many of these are explicitly denomi-
nated non-criminal. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (Consol. 2003) (distinguishing defi-
nitions of violation, offense, and misdemeanor). They do, however, carry the burden
of an arrest and court process to resolve. Most also result in a record which may
effect how future interactions with law enforcement are handled and even non-crimi-
nal violations can have significant collateral consequences in housing, employment
and immigration.
23. DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT
WORK 30-32 (2002).
24. A reasonably modern code, completely redrafted in the 1970s under the influ-
ence of the Model Penal Code.
25. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (Consol. 2003).
26. Id. § 240.25-.26.
27. Id. § 120.15.
28. Id. § 120.00.
29. N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 100(4) (Consol. 2004).
30. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1220(a) (Consol. 2004).
31. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 19-0107(2) (Consol. 2004).
1164
ADJUDICATION OF MINOR OFFENSES
that our substantive laws, drafted in the spirit of overcriminaliza-
tion and discretion, create an inexhaustible supply of potential de-
fendants in minor cases.
Mr. Ramos's case illustrates a less common subcategory of broad
minor proscriptions, conduct most people would just not think is
illegal. Mr. Ramos was charged with possession of a gravity
knife.32 Commonly called a per se deadly weapon under New York
State law, it is one of a group of nasty sounding weapons, including
switchblade knives, gravity knives, ballistic knives, and brass
knuckles, the simple possession of which is a crime.33 There is no
requirement that one possess the weapon with the intent to use it
unlawfully. 34 The legislature reasonably determined that some
weapons are so dangerous that they should simply be banned. The
devil, of course, is in the details.
The New York Penal Law defines a gravity knife as any knife
that is released from its handle by gravity or centrifugal force and
is locked into place by a button or other device.35 It turns out that
knives fitting this definition are commonly sold by hardware and
camping stores across New York and the rest of the country, and
many men routinely carry such knives in their pockets. One com-
mon version is called the Clip-It, but any camping store carries
small knives, with blades that extend from their handles and lock
into place to prevent injury, should the knife fold while being used.
Although I did not think these knives could be operated by
centrifugal force, my students quickly showed me that any folding
knife can be "flipped" of "flicked" open by the right fast motion of
the wrist. I was quite surprised to learn that a common kind of
knife, sold at several stores within blocks of my office and routinely
carried by many New Yorkers, is in fact illegal, and the mere pos-
session of this knife, anywhere in New York State, could bring a
one year jail sentence.36
Although I was unaware when I first met Mr. Ramos of this par-
ticular wrinkle in the law, or how easy it is to flick open most
knives, I came to learn that some police officers know this statute
and its application to these common knives quite well. Of course
not everyone carries one of these little knives in New York, but
they are common enough to be worth looking out for. When you
32. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01(1) (Consol. 2003).
33. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(12) (Consol. 2003); § 265(5).
34. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 10.00(12), 265(5).
35. Id. § 265(5).
36. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 55.05(2) (Consol. 2003).
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add all the men who wear these knives clipped in their belts or
visible at the top of their pockets, to all those who do not know or
remember that the brown paper bag has to completely cover the
beer can, or who take one last puff on their cigarette as they walk
down the steps to the subway, you begin to get some picture of why
the street can sometimes appear to be a pond full of sitting ducks
to a police officer interested in an encounter with a citizen.
Some may reasonably respond that most of us enjoy the impor-
tant protection that comes from doing absolutely nothing wrong.37
After all, the police cannot just arrest anyone, if we consider the
real situation on the street once again. A police officer might con-
ceive an unmotivated, spontaneous desire to hassle a person upon
whom his eyes fall. That would be a bad thing, but our major con-
cern should not be the officer who acts for no reason or out of pure
evil. Supervisors who oversee police conduct, as well as the infre-
quency of such occurrences, reasonably protects us from that prob-
lem. Much more typically, the police officer has some reason for a
stop. If he or she is patrolling in a neighborhood in which a high
enforcement strategy is in effect, or he or she has an articulable
suspicion, or someone seems out of place or the officer needs to
make an arrest to fill a quota-it is easy enough to find a person to
arrest. How about the out of place person; such as Mr. Ramos, a
young, light skinned Latino male in a predominantly African-
American neighborhood. In these cases, overcriminalization and
discretion, coupled with the structural realities of minor criminal
court, come into play to make this an easy, but dangerous,
response.
Overcriminalization has a different impact in the area of minor
transgressions because it reaches almost everyone. This is an im-
portant contrast with more serious offenses. From 1989 to 1996,
Congress added ten new statutes and increased the ways a cocaine
trafficker could be charged under federal law.38 These statutes
gave prosecutors additional power, but that enforcement power
only encompasses the narrow group of malefactors who traffic in
37. This might be true, if we claim that we are currently engaged in no conduct
which would give a police officer reasonable cause to believe we are committing an
offense in his presence. So long as I am not driving my car or jaywalking, I could
often meet that standard in New York City.
38. See generally Elizabeth Tison, Amending the Sentencing Guidelines for Co-
caine Offenses: The 100-to-1 Ratio is Not As 'Cracked' Up as Some Suggest, 27 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 413 (2003) (discussing the current approach to federal sentencing policy for
cocaine offenses).
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cocaine.39 Although there may be more cocaine dealers than we
can prosecute, making overcriminalization and discretion an im-
portant tool for allocating scarce resources, we would prosecute all
the cocaine dealers, if we could. Full enforcement of serious crime
is a reasonable aspiration. Of course scarce resources generally re-
quire us to limit our enforcement resources, but we reasonably ex-
pect that both police and prosecutors will only decline to prosecute
narcotics trafficking cases for which they have good evidence for
good reasons.
The situation is quite different with many minor offenses. The
police simply must ignore most minor crimes. In New York City
some police officers know that if they stand on the corner near a
construction site they could arrest all the construction workers car-
rying Clip-It and similar knives, along with those who drink a can
of beer with their al fresco lunch. Yet it would make no sense to do
that everyday, or for however long it took to stop the workers from
wearing the knives in plain view and drinking the beer outdoors.
Full enforcement, understood as at least the aspiration to prose-
cute every offender, is simply not a useful idea when it comes to
minor offenses in a regime of overcriminalization. Discretion is the
inevitable partner of overcriminalization and its control rightly
concerns us.
Perhaps police discretion in enforcing the law is best controlled
by the enforcement of rights. This is the core idea underlying the
suppression remedy in our Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence."n Although a police officer could charge many people with
some minor crime justifying an arrest and its accompanying sanc-
tions and abrogation of rights, his or her ability or incentive to do
so could be significantly curtailed by constitutional protections or
the threat of civil liability. But it is not, at least in the world of
minor offenses.
Police officers have the authority in every state to arrest people
when the officer has probable cause to believe the person has com-
mitted a minor offense in the officer's presence.4 The warrant
clause offers no protection here. One might counter that it is not
so easy for police officers to see many crimes and they still lack the
authority to walk up to someone and search them. That depends,
however.
39. Id.
40. U.S. CONST. amends. IV & V.
41. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
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Let us just put aside how riddled the Fourth amendment law has
become with exceptions and justifications for searches and
seizures.42 What motivates or constrains police officers to stay
within the law in minor cases? In my experience, it is not the sys-
tem that facilitates the adjudication of minor offenses. Police of-
ficers in New York City typically have little or no ongoing contact
with the cases that result from the arrests they make. For the half
of all arrests that result in immediate disposition, either because
prosecution is denied or more commonly, the case is resolved with
a plea at arraignment, any police misconduct is rendered irrelevant
and goes unreviewed.43
Among the cases that go forward in Criminal Court, motions
raising issues of police conduct, the guise of suppression motions,
are filed in many of the cases in which the State has seized physical
evidence, intends to use a custodial statement or will offer an out
of court identification." Although one might hope those are the
cases that involve the worst behavior, there are several reasons to
think the selection is quite imperfect. The cases involving the
clearest problems may end up being declined or dismissed. If they
are not dismissed, they are likely the cases in which the best offers
are made. Thus, in the minor cases there is a selection bias against
having a court hear the cases involving the worst police conduct.
This is quite different from serious offenses, in which the state is
much more likely to act on the full enforcement paradigm.
42. Id.
43. Though some commentators, such as Prof. Schuck, argue that fear of litigation
leads officials to engage in self-protection and risk-minimizing behavior, there is no
empirical evidence to support this. Stephanie E. Balcerzak, Qualified Immunity for
Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purposes in Civil Rights Liti-
gation, 95 YALE L.J. 126, n.ll (1985) (citing P. SCHUCK, SUING THE GOVERNMENT 47-
51 (1983)); cf L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the
Exclusionary Rule; A New and Extensive Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule
and a Call for a Civil Administrative Remedy to Partially Replace the Rule, 83 IowA L.
REV. 669 (1998) (examining several empirical studies of the exclusionary rule's appli-
cation and concluding that it does not adequately deter police misconduct).
44. There is also the separate process of complaints filed directly against police
officers, outside of any pending criminal litigation. During the first three years of
Giuliani's quality-of-life initiative, The Civilian Complaint Review Board (the may-
oral agency in New York that receives charges of police wrongdoing) registered a
sixty-eight percent rise in the number of allegations of police misconduct. Harcourt,
supra note 6, at 167-68. Furthermore, in 1997, the New York Times reported that the
city received 8,316 court claims of police misconduct between 1994 and 1996, in com-
parison with the 5,983 complaints received in the previous three years. Matthew
Purdy, In New York, the Handcuffs Are One-Size Fits All, N.Y. TIMES, August 24,
1997, at Al.
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Even where the defendant files the motions and the prosecution
goes forward with the case, the minor stakes encourage continued
winnowing out of the meritorious claims. In a minor case, a police
officer who mishandled a street encounter may simply not cooper-
ate with a junior Assistant District Attorney, knowing that the case
will likely be pled out or be dismissed for violation of 30.30,45 as
the speedy trial clock runs down. It is a common and unremark-
able occurrence. More likely, the police officer will come to court
and offer a version of the encounter that passes constitutional mus-
ter during a pre-trial hearing. For several reasons, these hearings
are almost always discovery sessions, not real fact finding hearings
intended by the defense to demonstrate police illegality. It is hard
to know whether that is caused by the low likelihood of winning or
vice versa. In minor cases almost all the arrests develop quite
quickly and there are no witnesses besides the police officer and
the defendant. Based on my experience, it seems that the police
officer almost always wins that credibility contest. When there are
other witnesses, the low stakes and uncertainty about whether and
when the hearing will take place means that police officers are very
rarely called.
Regarding the very small of number of cases in which the hear-
ing is actually held, a record is developed that suggests some police
illegality and the judge or hearing officer is inclined to limit the
state's use of certain evidence. There is still no impact upon police
conduct. The suppression of evidence in a minor case is a very rare
event, but when it does happen, it is of no consequence to anyone.
As I noted, this is in contrast to when this occurs in more serious
cases, wherein suppression of evidence can gain public attention,
cause police officers great consternation and impact their conduct
in other ways.
No one in the system believes, or acts like, suppression hearings
are really about discovering and providing disincentives to police
violation of rights. Rather, the hearings are part of the shell of
procedural justice the systems' players use to insulate themselves
from forces outside the court, and to ensure that the cases are re-
solved according to the internal marketplace of the system, rather
than according to any measure of worth that would place control
outside the court.
45. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.30 (Consol. 2003) (setting forth speedy trial time
limitations).
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I. THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING ARRESTED FOR A
MINOR TRANSGRESSION
If there is little constraint upon the police power to arrest for
minor offenses, perhaps we should not be so concerned because
little harm is done. To test this proposition, consider the conse-
quences of violating a minor proscription. One of the most signifi-
cant aspects of public order policing, as practiced in New York City
since 1992, is the policy of arresting, rather than issuing summonses
to many of the people charged with minor transgressions.46 In New
York City, I have come across people who have been charged with
non-criminal transgressions such as drinking alcohol in public,4 7
who were handcuffed and incarcerated for up to twenty-four hours.
Both the New York Criminal Procedure Law48 and Supreme Court
precedent4 9 authorize these arrests. One stunning aspect of the
public order policing is that is has resulted in many more people
spending some time in jail without any change in the law or adjudi-
cative practices. It essentially allows the police to impose the sanc-
tion of twenty-four hours in jail on whomever they may choose.
A remarkable fact is that this unofficial sanction has been re-
duced between one-half and two-thirds over the past ten years,
with no change in the adjudicatory system. Up until 1991, it typi-
cally took between forty-eight and seventy-two hours for people to
be arraigned after their arrest. 50 Under threat of civil suit, the po-
lice and the courts worked together administratively to reduce the
pre-arraignment time in custody to less than twenty-four hours in
almost all cases.5" The impact of this change in New York City can
only be fully appreciated when one accounts for how these cases
are typically litigated and sanctioned.
About half the arrests are fully resolved by the time the case is
arraigned and the defendant makes his or her first appearance
46. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
47. N.Y. ALco. BEV. CONT. LAW § 100(4) (Consol. 2004).
48. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (Consol. 2003).
49. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326-27, 354 (2001) (holding that
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police officers from arresting persons for
minor criminal offenses without a warrant).
50. See N.Y. CRIM. PROc. Law § 140.20(1) (providing that upon a warrantless ar-
rest, a police officer shall perform without unnecessary delay pre-arraignment tasks);
see also Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 387 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding pre-arraignment
delays of up to seventy-two hours constitutional).
51. See People ex rel. Marian v. Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223, 223-24 (N.Y. 1991) (hold-
ing that arrestees held in custody for more than twenty-four hours without arraign-
ment are entitled to release unless an acceptable explanation for the delay is given).
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before a judge.5 2 Most of these cases are resolved at the arraign-
ment by a plea or acceptance of an adjournment in contemplation
of dismissal ("ACD"). 53 Virtually all of these defendants will never
appear in court again on the case and most will walk out of the
courtroom at the end of the arraignment. A small group will serve
an additional period of time in jail and will then be released. Inter-
estingly, the cases resolved at arraignment tend to fall into two
groups: the most obviously trivial of the cases and those who are
willing to accept the sanction of a conviction and perhaps minor
additional punishment to complete the adjudication process that
day. The most obviously trivial, such as those charged for the first
time with smoking marijuana in public or eating on a subway car,
receive an ACD and leave the courtroom. In six months their
records will be sealed and under New York law, their arrest will be
a legal nullity. 4 They will, however, have spent the night in jail
and may be treated less leniently should they come through the
system again.55
The second group of cases resolved at arraignment are more va-
ried. For some, the prospect of a non-criminal violation with no
additional sanction is more attractive than returning to court. For
some, the prospect of even a misdemeanor record, usually another
on a record already sullied, is more attractive than returning to
court for an uncertain result. For another group, bail is the decid-
ing factor. If a defendant is denied bail, she will likely spend more
time waiting for the case to be resolved than would have been im-
posed in a jail term.5 6 For some, the quick resolution may be the
result of bad advice but hard eyed consideration of the path of liti-
gation in that courthouse suggests that immediate resolution
makes a certain sense in many cases.
52. In 1998, 46.6% of all non-felony, non-Vehicle and Traffic Law arrests were
resolved by conviction at arraignment. An additional 24.5% of the arrests were re-
solved by adjournment in contemplation of dismissal at arraignment and 1.6% were
dismissed at arraignment. NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, TRENDS IN
CASES AND DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTICS, AND CRIMINAL COURT PROCESSING AND
OUTCOMES, IN NON-FELONY ARRESTS PROSECUTED IN NEW YORK CITY'S CRIMINAL
COURTS tbl. 14 (2002).
53. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. Law § 170.55 (Consol. 2003).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. This is the one thing lawyers can do improve bail chances. See Douglas L.
Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the
Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1722-23 (2002) (using a study of
Baltimore lawyers who represented low-income defendants to argue for the use of
representation at bail proceedings).
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Typically, about half the cases continue past the arraignment
stage. Usually the defendant will be directed to return to court in
between two and six weeks. The second appearance in the case
will be for one of three purposes: filing of a corroborating affidavit,
response and decision on motions or "disposition," a term of art
for an adjournment during which nothing is likely to happen.
The important point for our purpose is that in most cases, the
defendant must return to court three to six times before there is
any real likelihood that a witness will be called and a factual record
developed. That factual record is most likely to be the limited re-
cord of a suppression hearing. From my experience, moving from
suppression hearing to trial will often require between two and six
additional appearances. Each court appearance requires a trip to
the courthouse and between one and five hours waiting time in the
courtroom. The vast majority of the appearances involve no sub-
stantive action by the court or parties. A defendant may be di-
rected to return because the state did not file a response, because
the People were not ready on some randomly selected hearing date
or because his lawyer took no action on the case. In my experi-
ence, without any delay by the defense, it is very rare for a case to
get to trial before the fifth court date.
After spending a night in jail, five or more trips down to the
courthouse can be a very burdensome price to pay to take a chance
on lowering or eliminating a marginal sanction, which is what these
repeated appearances are about. A defendant charged with a vio-
lation already faces a non-criminal charge, which will be sealed by
operation of law, even upon conviction.57 She may be offered a
plea requiring a day or two of community service and must weigh
that offer against the prospect of returning to court repeatedly in
the hope that the people will misstep enough to use up their speedy
trial time and the case will simply be dismissed. A defendant
charged with a misdemeanor may face slightly higher stakes, as he
faces a criminal conviction, but the comparison remains the same.
She is weighing the cost of repeated additional appearances against
the benefit of the chance that the state will not be able to pursue
the case. But almost always, it is only the marginal sanction at is-
sue-the day or two of community service and the impact of the
misdemeanor on ones record. The most significant part of the
price has already been paid through the arrest and pre-arraignment
detention.
57. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(3) (Consol. 2003).
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For those facing a violation, the real choice post arraignment is
between an additional three to five trips to court and three to fif-
teen hours waiting time, along with the risk of a bench warrant to
save the stigma of a sealable non-criminal violation and perhaps a
day or two of community service. Defendants in this situation are
rarely willing to invest their time and energy in what is almost al-
ways a fruitless effort to create a factual record of what happened
in their case, and in the rare case when that record is developed,
nothing comes of it. This process can have no impact on police
behavior.
Those facing misdemeanors face a slightly harder choice, but few
of them will receive a sanction harsher than the day they have al-
ready spent in jail. For them, the decision to return to court turns
on how to weigh the cost of the record of a conviction, the addi-
tional time in court, and the risk of a bench warrant, against the
reasonable, but fairly randomly distributed possibility that if they
stick it out, the case will be disappear and the much lower chance
that the offer will get worse.
The crowded calendar, which makes it seem impossible to do
much more than set another date to appear in most of the cases,
functions as the key management tool in the modern lower crimi-
nal court. Although defendants are told they can have a trial and
insist upon their procedural rights, a high cost is imposed upon
those who take that path. This is nothing new or distinctive in
American criminal justice. Encouraging pleas by imposing costs
upon those who seek a trial has been the American way of doing
business for a long time. But in the minor cases, the stakes are so
low, the difference in outcome between plea and trial often so mi-
nor and the results are so randomly distributed that it is almost
impossible to compel defendants to make rational choices based on
the seriousness of their conduct and the likelihood that the state
can prove its case. The transaction costs associated with reaching
the merits of the case are so high compared to the marginal value
of exercising one's rights, that it hardly ever makes sense to try a
case in Manhattan Criminal Court.
One solution would be to raise the stakes in these cases to en-
courage more of the defendants to take the charges seriously
enough to demand a trial. Prosecutors could insist on guilty pleas
to A misdemeanor charges and ask for jail time in more of the
cases. That change would likely result in somewhat more trials, 58
58. Although the federal experience does not make that so clear. When the sen-
tencing guidelines and mandatory minimums came into force in the early 1990s, many
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improving the ability of these courts to better sort cases on their
merits and play a greater role in monitoring police conduct. In-
creasing the stakes in minor offenses would also be consistent with
the political and social pressures that have made zero tolerance
such a popular slogan.59 It would, however, be a mistake to con-
tinue to raise the penalties we impose on these minor cases.
Today, many more minor offenders are sanctioned by arrest and
prosecution than was the case ten years ago. The offenses are mi-
nor because they involve minor normative transgressions, cause
minor harms, and are quite common. We all understand what sep-
arates us from the bank robber or the murderer-most of us do not
commit such offenses. But how many of us have a utility knife at
home that meets the statutory definition of gravity knife, drink a
beer outdoors, fall asleep on the subway, or have ever had an argu-
ment in public? Many of us are minor transgressors, at the mercy
of a police officer having a particularly bad day. These are each
sufficient reasons to impose very minor sanctions in these cases.
On a retributivist theory of punishment, even a weak principle of
proportionality recommends minor sanctions for minor
transgressions.60
predicted a surge in trials, but the surge never came. In fact, rates of pleas increased
for many offenses. See Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing
Revolution: How Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcot-
ics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 87, 118 & n.146-47 (2003) (observing that the
number of guilty pleas from fraud and robbery defendants increased between 1996
and 2000).
59. See David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Re-
sponse to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1064-65 (1999).
Despite its name, there is no such thing as zero tolerance, police will always have to
make decisions often on an ad hoc basis, about which law violations to tolerate, and
which to pursue. David Garland, Overall Perspectives on Crime is Not the Problem:
Criminology, Crime Control, and the American Difference, 69 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1137,
1148 (1998) (arguing that between 1960-1990, the criminal justice system gradually
defined deviance down and filtered out minor illegalities); Harcourt, supra note 6, at
209 (arguing that John Stuart Mill's harm principle, i.e. that "the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised. . . . is to prevent harm to others is no longer
a limiting principle on legal intervention due to the proliferation of harm arguments."
(quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Pub-
lishing Co. 1978, 1859))).
60. The development of a range of collateral consequences now associated with
very minor offenses aggravates the problem of imposing just punishment in these
cases. Misdemeanor convictions, and even some non-criminal dispositions, can have
immigration consequences, require sex offender registration, impact on public hous-
ing and public benefits, affect future eligibility for certain kinds of plea offers and
sentences and affect employment. See generally Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing In-
ternal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV 153 (1999).
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The retributivist waters have been muddied in recent years as we
consider how to think about these offenses in deterrence terms. A
simple understanding of the broken windows theory,61 and some
related arguments, suggests there is greater harm than we recog-
nize in minor offenses. If minor public disorder leads to major
public disorder, then littering or fighting in public should be
harshly punished to curb robbery and murder. But the empirical
case has not been made and the data does not support any link
between the prosecution of minor offenses and the rate of major
crime. 62 Even were there is empirical link, deep and difficult nor-
mative questions remain.63
There has been a nationwide drop in crime rates, but its causes
are clearly quite complex, as rates have dropped in jurisdictions
widely varying policing practices. 64 Here in New York City, the
very impressive drop in crime rates seems related to more aggres-
sive data based policing and demographic shifts.65 It appears quite
likely that the enforcement of minor offenses has played a role and
has crime control value, but in considering the role of adjudication,
it is very unlikely that the courts have played any significant role.
The crime control comes from more police contacts with more peo-
These consequences are uncommon and unpredictable in two different senses.
First, it is hard to predict who, among the many people who are arrested for minor
offenses, will actually be convicted of an offense carrying collateral consequences.
The system is too random and shot through with procedural defenses to make good
predictions at the outset of a case. Thus, it seems hard to support the argument that
the harshest consequences are really likely to fall reliably on those most deserving of
those consequences. Secondly, even among those upon whom these consequences
might fall, those convicted of offenses that can carry these consequences, it is hard to
predict what will happen. As recent changes in immigration law make clear, defend-
ants are at risk that future changes in the law will have retroactive effect. Cf Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1228
(2004) (making the expanded definition of aggravated assault an offense for which an
alien may be deported retroactively applicable). It is often impossible to predict
whether or not a public agency or employer will learn of, or take action on account of
these offenses. The consequences of minor transgressions are shot through with arbi-
trary application and random outcomes.
61. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 6.
62. See id.
63. See Harcourt, supra note 6, at 124. Harcourt argues that there is little evi-
dence that Guiliani's quality of life initiative primarily caused the decline in crime;
other more likely factors include: 1) an increase in the number of police officers; 2)
shifting drug use patterns; and 3) computerized tracking systems. Id. Harcourt main-
tains that whatever effect Guiliani's initiative did have was due to aggressive policing,
not the Broken Windows effect. Id.
64. See id.
65. See generally id. at 47-50 (discussing the implementation of Giuliani's "quality
of life" initiative).
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66pie, based on data about where and when crime occurs. From the
point of view of reducing serious crime, it is high value to pick up a
turnstile jumper and discover a gun or an outstanding felony war-
rant.67 It is silly to fetishize the adjudication of a turnstile jumper
who is just a turnstile jumper, in the mistaken expectation that we
can control more serious disorder or have a positive impact on po-
lice behavior.
Although the police bring many more minor cases to the court
system, the actual sanction in most cases has decreased over the
past five years 68 and the adjudicatory system is unchanged. It does
not sort the cases any better than it used to and it still relies almost
entirely upon the dance of apparent procedure as the cover story
for a system of internal bargaining. The drop in crime rates, in the
absence of any adjudicatory reform, strongly suggests that the mi-
nor criminal courts have played no role in these changes, beyond
processing the increased caseload in the time honored way. It ap-
pears that court imposed sanctions have played no role in the drop
in crime rates, as those sanctions have held steady or decreased
during the period in which crime rates have dropped.
What then do our minor criminal courts do and what might they
do? In New York City, the criminal courts continue the long
American practice of processing cases, according to an internally
developed marketplace that is only loosely related the facts or mer-
its of the individual case. Although this marketplace operates with
the forms of procedural justice that pretend to monitor police con-
duct, in fact police discretion is exceedingly broad in this class of
offenses and receives no meaningful check from the lower court
bench.
Many others have critiqued the procedural69 and substantive 7°
doctrines we have inherited from the Warren Court. Whatever
their efficacy or justice in more significant cases, I have tried to
66. Id. at 98-99.
67. For example, John Royster, who fatally beat a flower shop owner and as-
saulted several women (including a piano teacher in Central Park) was caught after
being arrested and fingerprinted for turnstile jumping. Harcourt, supra note 6, at 101.
68. Because the most common sanction is the time spent in jail before arraign-
ment and that time has been cut from three days to one. See People ex rel. Marian v.
Brown, 570 N.E.2d 223, 223-24 (N.Y. 1991).
69. See generally Cole, supra note 59 (discussing the Court's emphasis on limiting
police discretion since the Warren Court).
70. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 551-52 (arguing
that invalidation of public order rules is not the appropriate way to curb police discre-
tion, and instead advocating community-police enhancing reciprocity).
1176
ADJUDICATION OF MINOR OFFENSES
make a simpler point about suppression of evidence and vagueness
and overbreadth review in lower criminal courts. The low stakes
involved in these cases make it almost impossible to litigate the
significant legal issues these cases can present. Malcolm Feeley's
classic The Process is the Punishment,71 still captures what may be
the most essential truth about the lower criminal court-so long as
the cost of the proceeding is greater than the ultimate sanction,
most cases will never be litigated. This is the central flaw in the
application of the due process model72 to the lower criminal
court.
7 3
II. IMAGINING AN ALTERNATIVE
I have tried to explain some of the structural features of our sys-
tem for adjudicating minor offenses that have long made it difficult
to resolve these cases on the merits or use them to check the au-
thority of police and prosecutors. Because the lower courts have
been processing, rather than really adjudicating cases for so long
been, many find it difficult to imagine how else they could operate.
Even if we can picture a different system in a moment of creativity,
many are quick to offer reasons why the system will never change.
Indeed, that cast of inevitability, the sense that things will never
change in the lower courts, may be the greatest barrier." But
courts can change, and do change, as the rise of problem solving
courts across the country well illustrates. Those closest to the situ-
ation often find it hardest to see the possibilities.
The case for change is very strong. The best that I can say about
the adjudication of minor offenses is that it has not gotten too
much in the way of whatever has caused crime rates to drop over
that last ten years. It is hard to see much in the way of positive
contributions, and easy to find fault with the way we have done
71. See FEELEY, supra note 4.
72. See generally Herbert Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 114 U. PA.
L. REv. 1 (1964) (describing a due process model designed to protect the rights of the
accused by placing obstacles to carrying them past each step in the legal process).
73. Of course, when the stakes are high enough, it makes sense to pay the price for
procedural justice because the benefits clearly outweigh the costs for most individuals
and the system.
74. Almost all of the judges, lawyers and court personnel are people of good will
whose daily work lives are an intense whorl of real activity and hard work. They do
not see themselves as wasting a great deal of time and energy in a system that masks
an internal marketplace with talk of procedural justice. I do not criticize the individu-
als at all, as it seems that many of us are caught in systems and habits that defy logic
but appear sensible, inevitable and unchangeable from the inside. Cf GARLAND,
supra note 12 (observing that we quickly grow used to the way things are).
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business for a long time. We should, however, have higher aspira-
tions for the criminal courts in which more than ninety percent of
the cases are heard.
We should focus the adjudication of minor cases on the develop-
ing a factual record about what happened, including the conduct at
issue,75 its impact on victims, and the community and the defen-
dant's background and situation. We could use a less formal record
that we would develop at a full trial, on the model of a preliminary
hearing. We could use that record of the conduct of both the de-
fendant and the police to seek a resolution that does justice, with-
out imposing harsh sanctions. This would require a live witness in
many more cases. There are procedural changes, however, that
could shift much of the system's resources from setting adjourned
dates to resolving most cases on the merits by the second court
appearance. The goals would be justice and transparency.
Two modest changes in the New York Criminal Procedure Law
could shift the day to day work of the Criminal Court from case
processing to adjudication on the merits.76 The first would substi-
tute a live witness, at a preliminary hearing type of proceeding, for
the written corroborating affidavits in New York state law.77 The
second would change the pleading burdens to get a pretrial sup-
pression hearing7s in a non-felony case so they require a first per-
son affidavit from the defense to gain a hearing. These procedural
changes would dramatically alter the litigation of misdemeanors by
requiring a live prosecution witness at the charging stage of the
75. In these police initiated minor cases, developing a record of the defendant's
conduct will often also develop a complete record of the police officer's actions in the
incident.
76. Another modest change that could have a very significant impact is simply to
schedule fewer cases in each misdemeanor courtroom for any given day, and devote
more time to each case with the goal of making real progress in court, rather than just
setting another date.
77. Under New York State law, the prosecution's accusatory instrument must be
supported by a first person sworn statement with facts supporting each element of the
offense. Unless and until this corroborating affidavit has been filed, the prosecution
has not met its pleading burden and the case cannot go forward without the defen-
dant's consent. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 100.15, 100.30, 100.40 (Consol. 2003). In
practice, many defendants will waive the right to be prosecuted by a legally sufficient
accusatory instrument and enter a plea of guilty to a hearsay complaint, while others
will make one, two, or three court appearances at which the case is on for corrobora-
tion, and then have their case dismissed if the affidavit is not filed.
78. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw §§ 710.60 (Consol. 2003) (permitting affidavits on in-
formation and belief in support of a motion to suppress evidence). Federal law re-
quires that the defendant submit a personal knowledge affidavit, making it more
difficult to file suppression motions. United States v. Gillette, 383 F.2d 843, 848 (2d
Cir. 1967).
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case, and greatly reducing the number of suppression hearings that
are granted.
There is also one additional institutional change required to
make adjudication on the merits possible. The Assistant District
Attorney responsible for the case must appear in court for the pre-
liminary hearing. To put it another way, the court should insist that
the lawyer representing the People in court that day exercise real
prosecutorial authority and not just act as a clerk, reading from a
note. We could then develop a culture in which most cases are
resolved at the preliminary hearing stage, for reasons having to do
with the facts developed at that appearance. For those who choose
not to resolve cases at that early stage, formal motion practice and
trial would always remain an option.
The first criticism will be that caseload pressures make these
changes impossible. I side with Professor Feeley, and others, who
have forcefully argued that caseload pressures are not the cause of
the emphasis placed on rapid disposition and procedure in the
criminal court. Professor Feeley observed that courts with fewer
cases simply worked shorter hours and did not spend more time on
each case.79
There are real possibilities for change in this system. Some of
that potential can be realized by addressing the staggering ineffi-
ciencies under which we currently labor. The typical case requires
several appearances at which nothing substantive happens. De-
fendants and lawyers frequently appear in court, with all the at-
tendant waiting time, just to set another date to return to court.
Although everyone appears to be very busy and reasonably feels
quite pressured by the large dockets, there is really very little being
accomplished.
There are, of course, reasons why the lower courts operate this
way. Acting within this shell of procedural justice is easy for the
professionals because it permits them to escape virtually all respon-
sibility for meeting professional standards, and ensures that the
cases will be resolved according to their interests, rather than those
of the public or the defendants. We can understand the behavior
of the lawyers and judges through the lens of incentives and agency
problems, institutional role definition, or a preference for personal
relationships over formal connections defined by law. We under-
stand, however, the forces that have brought us where we are to-
79. See FEELEY, supra note 4, at 260-61.
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day, we must recognize that it ill serves the defendants and
especially the public.
Defense lawyers can justify their failure to interview clients
outside of court, conduct investigations or engage in any substan-
tive legal research, with the claim that they are too burdened by
their many required court appearances. Never mind that nothing
happens at most of those court appearances and what little does
happen is completely uninformed by the actual facts of the case,
the defendant's background or the law. Something is getting done
and the lawyers are busy-even if the work they are doing does not
serve their clients. The system permits the defense lawyers, and
indeed all of the professionals, to spend most of their time engaged
in relatively simple, undemanding but still undeniably professional
tasks.8°
Adjudication within the shell of procedural justice also gives tre-
mendous power to the lawyers. From the defense lawyer's per-
spective, much of what happens in the case is within the lawyer's
sphere of technical expertise. My clients rarely have a view on
whether the corroborating affidavit is sufficient or the motions well
pled. By marginalizing the significance of what happened and the
client's situation, the two things about which the client has better
information than the lawyer, the lower courts take these cases
away from the defendants and turn them over to the lawyer. In
most cases, the only thing I really need to know from my client are
how many times they are really willing to come back to court and
how big a cost they assign to a misdemeanor conviction and per-
forming a little community service. I can do a better job than many
of the other lawyers handling misdemeanor cases, if myself and my
students know more about our clients; but I can also play the pro-
cedural game without much input from my client, and unfortu-
nately most lawyers do exactly that. We keep setting new dates in
the case until our client decides he has had enough and takes the
offer.
These same forces play out in a different form for prosecutors.
First, they make essentially the same claim about their own inabil-
80. I make this observation, again, with respect for the professionals, who are
working in a frustrating system. My observation grows out of my own experience
with defense practice in both high and low volume settings. I have always exper-
ienced being in court as relatively straightforward and undemanding, except for the
few moments of terror when something really is happening before the judge. Com-
pared to spending time on the streets investigating, counseling clients or writing mo-
tions, waiting in court and then setting an adjourned date is a pretty undemanding
task, accomplished in a controlled setting.
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ity to stay on top of their many cases. They have to spend a good
deal of their time in court and have just a few hours at the start and
end of the day to talk with witnesses, draft papers, and carry out
their other responsibilities. In the lower-level court in which I
practice, the prosecutors very rarely appear on their own cases.
They read from a note in the file, have no personal knowledge
about the case in front of them and precious little discretion. This
classic agency problem relieves them of responsibility for what
happens in court, which is precious little anyway.
In that system, the prosecutor in court has virtually no opportu-
nity to use the facts of the case to make a decision about how to
handle the case in court. The prosecutor knows nothing about the
case, beyond the note at the top of the file from which he or she
reads. Any discretion the prosecutor may exercise in court, such as
agreeing to a judge's suggestion about a sentence or not opposing
some particular defense request, must be largely informed by the
prices set by the market, not the facts of the case. Although the
prosecutor actually assigned to the case will base her plea offer and
other actions upon some individualized understanding of the case
at hand, the inefficient, procedurally focused system discourages
prosecutors from learning much about each of their many cases-
most of which will be resolved with reference to the commodity
price of the case, not an individual pricing.
The shell of procedural justice also suits judges. Although it
must have its frustrations, they spend their days moving cases
along, making relatively few legal decisions. Although they are
busy, the key to the work is moving through the docket of one to
two hundred cases without major delay. The judges in these courts
make legal decisions, but few of the appearances present a request
for legal relief. Most of the appearances are resolved by agree-
ment between the parties, or most commonly, scheduling another
court date.
Other constituencies also benefit from this inefficient system.
The large dockets and multiple appearances increase the impor-
tance and number of court officers and other personnel required to
keep things moving. The system in which I litigate has raised the
art of ensuring it is overburdened to a fine art, all the while making
a range of choices that guarantee that cases will not be handled
expeditiously or decided on their merits. Perhaps it is time we
stopped blaming the criminal court and started thinking realisti-
cally about what it can, and cannot, do in America.
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